Evidence record / paperclip

A dated record of one change, kept so the writing that cites it can be checked. Compiled from the sources listed below by the research run, not written for reading. The judgment lives in the issues that cite it, below.

2026-10-13-paperclip-v2026-1012-0-lets-low-trust-agents-take-a-human-exact-task-outside-intake-scope

v2026.1012.0 lets low-trust agents take a human exact task outside intake scope. An authenticated board user can direct a low-trust agent through owner chat or exact task assignment outside the normal intake boundary. Dispatch and API authorization recheck the active run and current task using server-owned wake provenance. Plugin sender attribution and an agent assertion do not qualify. The exception permits that exact task, not descendants, a whole project, secrets, runtime management or general instruction/configuration authority. Sandbox and isolated-workspace requirements remain. Owner-chat self-instruction edits are a separate qualified exception described in section 9.

Channel: tagged-release. Half: both. Date: 2026-10-12.

Operator consequence: Audit direct human assignments as explicit intake exceptions. Do not assume low trust means a task can never leave its initial project boundary, or that one human-directed task expands the entire trust scope. Use the live run/task provenance when investigating what it could access.

Receipt

Finding metadata

Run: 2026-10-13-profile-refresh-2026-09-21_2026-10-13-frontier-v0

Finding ID: 2026-10-13-paperclip-v2026-1012-0-lets-low-trust-agents-take-a-human-exact-task-outside-intake-scope

Source links

Primary links, including exact changelog lines when available.

Versioned source: run artifact