Finding / paperclip
2026-10-13-paperclip-v2026-1012-0-lets-low-trust-agents-take-a-human-exact-task-outside-intake-scope
v2026.1012.0 lets low-trust agents take a human exact task outside intake scope. An authenticated board user can direct a low-trust agent through owner chat or exact task assignment outside the normal intake boundary. Dispatch and API authorization recheck the active run and current task using server-owned wake provenance. Plugin sender attribution and an agent assertion do not qualify. The exception permits that exact task, not descendants, a whole project, secrets, runtime management or general instruction/configuration authority. Sandbox and isolated-workspace requirements remain. Owner-chat self-instruction edits are a separate qualified exception described in section 9.
Channel: tagged-release. Half: both. Date: 2026-10-12.
Operator consequence: Audit direct human assignments as explicit intake exceptions. Do not assume low trust means a task can never leave its initial project boundary, or that one human-directed task expands the entire trust scope. Use the live run/task provenance when investigating what it could access.
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Finding metadata
Run: 2026-10-13-profile-refresh-2026-09-21_2026-10-13-frontier-v0
Finding ID: 2026-10-13-paperclip-v2026-1012-0-lets-low-trust-agents-take-a-human-exact-task-outside-intake-scope
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- tagged commit file2026-10-13-paperclip-v2026-1012-0-lets-low-trust-agents-take-a-human-exact-task-outside-intake-scopepaperclipai/paperclip / doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.mdcommit2026-10-13-paperclip-v2026-1012-0-lets-low-trust-agents-take-a-human-exact-task-outside-intake-scopegithub.com/paperclipai/paperclip/commit/0829d94af2a2381d39dfa5eac4b80dac8539dff0