Claude Code: Three De-Facto Security Advisories Without an Advisory Surface

What Changed

Three Claude Code releases between 2026-05-21 and 2026-05-22 closed sandbox- and enforcement-layer regressions that read as security advisories — but Anthropic did not publish them as a separate advisory page. They appear in the changelog as ordinary fix entries.

v2.1.149 (2026-05-22) fixes a PowerShell permission bypass: built-in cd functions (cd.., cd\, cd~, X:) changed the working directory undetected, letting subsequent commands read outside the workspace. The same release fixes the sandbox write allowlist in git worktrees — it had been covering the entire main repository root instead of only the shared .git directory (with hooks/ and config denied). PowerShell prefix and wildcard allow rules also gained the ability to actually pre-approve native executables (they previously matched the wrong way).

v2.1.147 (2026-05-21) closed forceLoginOrgUUID and forceLoginMethod enforcement gaps against third-party-provider and API-key sessions — enterprise login pinning was not actually pinning under some auth modes.

Why It Matters

These are not minor bugs. PowerShell cd.. defeating the workspace boundary is the canonical sandbox-escape shape. A worktree write allowlist that scopes to the whole repo root, not the intended sub-path, is a contained-execution-environment regression. Enterprise login pinning that does not pin against third-party providers is a policy-enforcement regression.

In the editorial voice of the method: this is the kind of fix that an operator must upgrade before deploying. The fact that the changelog does not flag it as such is the operator-relevant detail.

Operator Implication

Operators running 2.1.148 or earlier — particularly Windows operators with PowerShell allowlists, git worktree workflows, or enterprise login pinning — should upgrade to 2.1.149+ before deploying new agents. Anyone running Vertex AI provider sessions should consult the 2.1.148 entry for the auth flow regression closed there.

Source-contract follow-up: sources/claude-code.yml names official_changelog as priority-1 but has no separate security advisory surface. Treat the changelog as the de-facto advisory surface or amend the contract to add one. This is recorded as a doctrine question in the audit note for this run.

Open

• The changelog is the only source for these advisories. Operators monitoring for security-advisory-shape events (RSS, security mailing lists, CVE feeds) will not catch them.
• The 2.1.148 Vertex AI fix is the third auth-layer enforcement bug closed in the same week. The pattern suggests broader auth-pinning audit work is in progress; the changelog does not name it.