Evidence record / gemini-cli

A dated record of one change, kept so the writing that cites it can be checked. Compiled from the sources listed below by the research run, not written for reading. The judgment lives in the issues that cite it, below.

2026-10-13-gemini-cli-v0-63-0-hardens-redirection-config-paths-reads-and-untrusted-resource-output

v0.63.0 hardens redirection config paths reads and untrusted resource output. Command-prefix ALLOW rules now need explicit allowRedirection for redirection even in autoEdit/YOLO. The allowed-path checker asks on .gemini configuration edits, recognizes more Windows short-name aliases and blocks .env.* except .env.example/.env.sample/.env.template/.env.dist. Reads re-resolve their target at execution and compare device/inode identities around the read. MCP resource listings/reads and web-search output gain untrusted-context wrappers. The repository’s own issue-triage/dedup workflows remove shell tools and parse model output outside the agent; that workflow change is not an npm default.

Channel: tagged-release. Half: both. Date: 2026-10-06.

Operator consequence: Recheck narrowly allowlisted redirected commands and unattended edits to .gemini config. Audit .env path exceptions against the exact template names. These checks reduce particular injection/race paths without proving every filesystem race or shell-write path is closed. The repository workflow shows useful authority reduction: let the agent classify, then parse its output in ordinary code.

Receipt

Finding metadata

Run: 2026-10-13-profile-refresh-2026-09-21_2026-10-13-frontier-v0

Finding ID: 2026-10-13-gemini-cli-v0-63-0-hardens-redirection-config-paths-reads-and-untrusted-resource-output

Profile citations

Source links

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Versioned source: run artifact