Per-sender tool policies via channel-scoped sender keys

What this changes for operators

• Operators running OpenClaw with public-facing channels can now restrict dangerous tools by requester identity rather than only by agent. Review your tool surfaces and decide whether the broader trust model (per-channel × per-sender) belongs in your deployment.
• Authority restriction now extends across global, agent, group, core, bundled, and plugin tool surfaces — operators should re-audit which surfaces hold authority decisions in their deployment and whether the requester-level layer makes some prior per-agent restrictions redundant.
• Three claim-level updates land in the same release: memory-wiki ingest now requires admin scope, Obsidian search requires write scope, and openclaw models auth login --provider openai defaults to ChatGPT/Codex login (API-key setup is now behind --method api-key). Setup scripts assuming read-only or API-key-first paths need to be updated.